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 The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s were marked by vicious ethnic conflict as the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) broke up into seven nation-states3.  The independence of 
these states did not bring the end of conflict, however.  Each had to navigate the reality of 
incorporating ethnic minority populations into the recently developed nationalist discourse, and 
post-Yugoslav language policies responded to "perceived threats to linguistic or national 
viability" (Friedman 2004: 219).  For Albanians in particular, there was a sense of discrimination 
from the new states they resided in.  While they had formed a sizable minority in SFRJ, they 
were now scattered across many states: they constitute a majority in Kosovo, with large minority 
populations in Macedonia and Serbia (Judah 2008: 3-5).  Thus, the end of SFRJ marked the end 
of traditional language contact in the region (Hill 2011: 411), as well as the end of what Bugarski 
(2004) describes as an "internationally acclaimed" policy of language equality (p. 189). 
Asserting a nation's rights against those of a minority nationality is a difficult balance to strike, 
and ethnic conflicts began anew in Serbia and Macedonia, and remained intractable in Kosovo.   
 Albanians' efforts centered on demands for improved language rights, including use of 
the Albanian language in the spheres of education, media and administration.  That the groups' 
grievances focused on language highlights two important points: the speakers of that language 
                                                          
1 This is a pre-publication draft; the article is 'To appear" in Language Policy.  
2 Thanks to Sibelan Forrester and Lee Smithey for their support and comments on an early version of this as my 
thesis at Swarthmore College, as well John Cox for his discussion and comments during examination.  This project 
would not have begun were it not for productive conversations with Orli Fridman regarding the status of language in 
the Balkans.  Additional thanks to John Singler for his comments, as well as suggesting sources.  Finally, thank you 
to two anonymous reviewers, whose comments have greatly strengthened the final product.  Any remaining errors 
are my own. 
3 In this paper I treat Kosovo, whose 2008 independence is disputed, as an independent state. 
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encountered structural violence from language policies in their daily lives, and language use is 
the key to defining identity for these speakers.  With that in mind, this paper discusses the link 
between language policies and ethnic conflict in the region.  While previous studies have 
addressed the contribution of debates surrounding the local Slavic languages to conflict (see 
Franolić 1980; Tollefson 2002), I instead focus on language policy toward Albanians in the 
former SFRJ.  Because language rights were closely tied to territory rather than populations 
(Tollefson 2002: 69), I compare policies in three regions with sizable Albanian populations: 
Serbia's Preševo Valley, Kosovo, and Macedonia (see Zymberi 1991; Friedman 2004 for older 
studies of Kosovo and Macedonia).  Previous studies of Albanian language policy and planning 
typically discuss the language in a pre-breakup context (Byron 1979; Byron 1985; Zymberi 
1991), and the recent conflicts have made a study of language policy somewhat difficult 
(Bugarski 2004).  To that end, I place an emphasis on understanding the role of language in the 
promotion and perpetuation of conflict in the region.  As such, this paper proceeds with a brief 
history of Yugoslavia and discussion of language policy and conflict in section 2, followed by a 
short history of language policies in the region from the time of the Ottoman Empire to 1945 in 
section 3.  From there, the three case studies in section 4 will enable a discussion in section 5 of 
why conflict in Kosovo, for example, remains intractable, while that in Serbia has been resolved 
relatively successfully.  I argue that while assimilationist language policies serve as both 
indicator/cause of conflict, policies emphasizing balanced bilingualism may be seen as a 
potential tool for conflict resolution. 
2. Background 
 It is impossible to give a full history of the formation and dissolution of SFRJ in the 
limited space here (see Silber and Little 1997; Judah 2008, inter alia for far more detail); 
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however, some background is necessary.  SFRJ was founded in 1945 by Josip Broz Tito and the 
communists who fought as Partisans in World War II.  It was composed of six republics—
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia—and two 
autonomous provinces within Serbia—Kosovo and Vojvodina.  Tito essentially controlled SFRJ; 
after his death in 1980, power was decentralized, as there were nine presidents wielding 
executive power: one for each republic and autonomous province, plus the head of the League of 
Communists.  This decentralization plus an economic crisis through the 1980s provided 
favorable conditions for political fracturing based on ethnic nationalism and calls for 
democratization.  In 1991, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Croatia seceded, followed by Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1992 (itself a reaction to Serbs declaring their own secession from the republic). 
This triggered the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, marked by atrocities and war crimes.  While six 
conflicts comprised the Yugoslav Wars, relevant here are the Kosovo War, ended by the 1999 
NATO intervention and bombing of Serbia, as well as the 1999-2001 conflict in the Preševo 
Valley of Serbia and 2001 conflict in Macedonia.  The Kosovo War ended with UN 
administration of Kosovo, which declared independence from Serbia in 2008.  Serbia does not 
recognize this, and only 108 of 193 UN members (23 of 28 EU members, four of six ex-
Yugoslav states) recognize Kosovo as a state. 
 Language played a role in the buildup of ethnic nationalism during the 1980s, both in 
Albanian agitation for greater language rights and Serbian and Macedonian reactionary 
repression of language rights.  Despite this, its impact is often overlooked, seen in claims that 
linguistic diversity obscures more important differences in the region (Duijzings 2000).  Though 
it is a prominent characteristic of the region, this very fact emphasizes its importance.  
Languages are inextricably linked to ethnic identities.  Often ethnic contact is first manifested in 
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language contact (Nećak-Lük 1997: 28), and as such is a symbol used to draw from the past and 
legitimize identities (Seneviratne 2005: 138).   
 My goal here is to explicitly link language policy and ethnic conflict, much as Wright 
(1997) links language policy to inter- and intrastate conflict.  As occurred in SFRJ, ethnic 
conflict often first appears in the form of issues involving communication and language 
maintenance (Williams 1997: 430).  When these questions of language use go unaddressed, the 
imbalance can mobilize people's sentiments, escalating the matter into what is traditionally 
termed ethnic conflict.  Even when language is not the immediate issue in a conflict, it takes on a 
highly symbolic role.  An institutionalized majority language with little support for minority 
languages highlights imbalances in social class and power between the two (Darquennes 2011: 
548). 
 Imbalanced language policies may be characterized as structural violence, defined by 
Galtung (1969) as social injustice: unequal institutions yield unequal chances in life for its 
victims (p. 171).  This can be seen if we consider the opportunities available to a speaker of a 
national language, as opposed to one of a local minority language.  Employment and access to 
social institutions are easier for the former, especially when linguistic rights of the minority are 
restricted.  This view of language policy in many ways echoes that of Skutnabb-Kangas (1997; 
2001), particularly her take on state policies of assimilation and discrimination.  It is consistent, 
however, with other views on language policy and linguistic diversity.  Consider views of 
language as environmental resource (Maffi 2005, Romaine 2007) or tool for access to citizenship 
(Heller 2013) or neoliberal economic development (da Silva and Heller 2009).  Under these 
views, discriminatory language policies constitute destruction of resources, "dis-citizenship" 
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(Heller 2013), or denial of economic opportunity.  Each of these, particularly the latter two, fall 
under the definition of structural violence.   
 It is well-established that language standardization and nation-building go hand in hand 
(Hobsbawm 1992; May 2001; Zahra 2008; Heller 2013).  Uniting based on a standardized 
language allows for maximum comprehensibility within the nation, while at the same time 
maximizing differences between the nation and its neighbors (Milroy and Milroy 1991).  
Standardization reflects the political goals of the elites, who cannot push for a nation's 
independence without convincing the people that they are in fact a nation.  To achieve this, the 
language is planned in three stages: status, corpus, and acquisition (Wright 2011: 780-82).  In the 
case of the Balkans, the South Slavic languages form a dialect continuum between the Eastern 
Alps and the Black Sea (Wright 1997: 231).  This means their division into Slovenian, 
Bosnian/Croatian/Montenegrin/Serbian4, Macedonian, and Bulgarian is more a political project 
designed to claim native speakers and territory than a natural distinction.  While Albanian is an 
isolate branch of Indo-European5, quite different from Slavic, its standardization into a single 
language is no less political.  Thus, the act of standardizing languages enabled the demarcation 
of the national groups (many with eponymous nation-states) that seem so fixed today.  As real as 
they seem, these ethnic groups are nevertheless imagined (Anderson 1991).   
 Nation building creates linguistic majorities as it promotes and requires convergence to a 
national culture and language. Those who do not or cannot make this move are constructed as 
linguistic minorities.  Movements of linguistic nationalism thus created a system in which there 
                                                          
4 The breakup of SFRJ coincided with the dissolution of Serbo-Croatian into Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and 
Serbian.  Henceforth, I call the language Serbo-Croatian when discussing events before the breakup and Serbian 
when discussing events after the breakup. 
5 Albanian has two main dialects: Gheg (spoken in Kosovo and northern Albania) and Tosk (spoken in Albania). 
Although 19th century nationalists considered uniting these, until 1968, these dialects both had a literary register and 
between 1945-1968 in particular, SFRJ Albanians standardized the Gheg dialect while those in Albania standardized 
the Tosk dialect.  In 1968, Albanians in Kosovo shifted their standard from their local Gheg dialect to the Tosk 
dialect of Albania (Byron 1979; Byron 1985). 
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is a clear majority and clear minority (Wright 2011: 782).  The nation-state is inherently violent, 
then, as identification with one nation demands an identification with one language.  It is 
difficult to promote one nation without it coming at the expense of other minorities, and the state 
culture promoted by nationalist ideologies makes structural violence toward minorities feel 
natural and necessary, alienating the Other and treating them as a second-class citizen (Galtung 
1990: 293-99).  This in turn serves to solidify the minority as a group.  Brubaker (2004) writes of 
groups as a process and event.  In this view, conflict is what forms the cohesiveness of groups, 
and the group is performed through the encouragement of agents and events.  The group is not a 
group per se, then, but rather a degree of groupness (Brubaker 2004: 8-15).  In this sense, it is not 
difficult to see how negative policies toward a language could encourage its speakers to coalesce 
into a group.  Nationalist ideologies require the local majority to assert a strong identity through 
excluding the minority, often restricting linguistic rights of the minority, including eradicating 
minority languages in favor of national ones.  This backfires when minority groups defensively 
emphasize the necessity of their own culture and language (Jacquemet 2005: 263-264). 
 Recognizing that discriminatory language policies are violent and linked to conflict 
provides an argument for strong language rights.  While the right to one's language has been 
recognized for some time, the interpretation of this varies between that of negative rights—the 
right to speak one's language without fear of punishment—and positive rights—the right to use 
one's language in state institutions or public space (Hogan-Brun and Wright 2013: 243; Wright 
2007).  The former would permit states to encourage assimilation, so long as those who chose to 
continue speaking their native language were allowed to do so.  However, positive language 
rights represent an obligation of the state to not only permit use of a particular language, but 
actively support the communities that use it.  This may seem problematic in conflict situations: 
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positive language rights are group rights that require minorities to "reinforce internal cohesion 
and encourage convergence among those on the periphery" (Hogan-Brun and Wright 2013: 243).  
As such, they appear to reify the group and be exclusionary.  However, Skutnabb-Kangas (1997) 
envisions these rights as reducing conflict, if applied correctly (p. 319).  This makes sense in the 
context of the Balkans.  Among people who already have a high degree of groupness from 
conflict, positive language rights would not serve to further increase groupnesss; rather, they 
would contribute to ameliorating the situation causing increased groupness. 
3. Regional Language Policy Before 1945 
 The denial of linguistic rights in the Balkans has been a tradition of the region since the 
time of the Ottoman Empire.  The region was historically multilingual, divided by religious 
groups in the millet system (Tanasković 1991: 145; Mazower 2000: xv; Friedman 2003: 261).  
This changed in the 19th century when several non-Muslim communities began following the 
Western example and agitating for autonomy.  This marked the beginning of linguistic 
nationalism in the region (Greenberg 2004: 9).  National print languages became of the utmost 
importance (Anderson 1991: 67), and there was an explosion of local print media beginning in 
the 18th century. Language standardization served to position an ethnic group not only in 
opposition to the Ottoman Empire, but in opposition to other groups as well (Bakić-Hayden 
1995: 917).  These movements advanced at different paces—by 1830, the Greek and Serbian 
nations had been viably created, while the Albanian and Macedonian nations were not yet 
conceptualized (Mazower 2000: 89).   
 The 1878 Treaty of Berlin gave independence to Serbia and Montenegro (Johanson 2011: 
730).  Under the treaty, Serbia received lands with Bulgarian and Albanian speakers, and 
annexed them brutally (Judah 2008: 35), with attempts to assimilate the non-Serb population 
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(Durham 1920).  Additionally, Slavs were resettled in the Albanian areas (Durham 1905: 65).  
Along with Greece, the new states had designs on the rest of Ottoman Macedonia, which was not 
a clearly defined territory but included several Albanian-speaking vilayets (Mazower 2000: 98).  
Elites of this region feared expansion from the new states (Judah 2008: 10), and created the 
League of Prizren, which advocated for an independent Greater Albania.  This organization 
originally worked with the Ottomans, but was put down in 1881 (Judah 2008: 36).  By that time, 
though, the League had created an ecumenical Albanian identity based on language—an 
important point, as Albanian speakers were mostly Muslim, but with significant numbers of 
Orthodox Christians and Catholics (Duijzings 2000). 
 Creating a language-based identity was no easy task.  As the Ottomans watched groups 
that standardized their languages earlier in the 19th century demand first autonomy and then 
independence, they forbade education in other local languages in an effort to maintain control.  
Thus, Albanian-language education was banned, replaced by Greek.  For Orthodox Christians in 
this part of the Balkans, Greek was an enforced language in the church as well (Durham 1920).  
The policy made it difficult to create a language-based identity, as there was no print media 
tradition or even a standardized alphabet to draw on (Durham 1904).  Despite these limitations, 
the Albanian identity caught hold.  The language was not permitted in schools or books, but 
found a place with Western assistance.  As an example, because the Ottoman Empire permitted 
translations of the Bible, a printer in London made one, which proved popular with Christians 
and Muslims alike (Durham 2001). Durham discusses meeting with an Ottoman official who 
displayed the government's fear of Albanian nationalism, yet believed this was a problem that 
could be fixed with the imposition of Turkish language education (Durham 1905: 213-224).  
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Even so, the Albanian language was secretly taught by Albanians (Byron 1979: 21), and openly 
taught by foreigners.   
 The occasional assistance extended to the Albanian language was one example of how 
the European Great Powers treated the Balkans as a proxy for their power struggles.  Any 
successful rebellion against the Ottoman Empire would require Great Power support.  Outside 
support was not forthcoming for Albanian nationalists, and the Albanian movement instead 
eventually found traction with the Ottoman Empire.  By 1912  it was ready to satisfy Albanian 
demands for autonomy, uniting modern Albania and Kosovo in one region (Adanir 2011: 119).  
The surrounding states would not stand for this, and launched the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.   
 Albania became an independent state in the aftermath of the wars, albeit a much smaller 
one than its leaders had hoped.  While Albania claimed every region with a substantial Albanian-
speaking population, including modern day Kosovo and parts of Ottoman Macedonia, the other 
victorious nations of Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece split these territories among 
themselves.  At this time, no Albanian-language schools or newspapers were allowed in their 
territories (Durham 2001: 84).  Several atrocities also were committed against the Albanians, 
particularly by the Serbs: massacres and plans to Serbianize the local Albanians so that they 
would cease speaking "that dirty language" (Durham 1920: 225). 
 In World War I, states in the region picked sides in order to maximize their gains.  
During and after the war, there was fighting between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo in 
particular (Mazower 2000: 117).  In response to Italian designs on parts of Slovenia and Croatia, 
these territories joined Serbia in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.  This new state 
absorbed Kosovo and Macedonia as well, without recognizing either territory by name (Drapac 
2010: 84).  The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had roots in the pan-Slav movement, 
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and this could be seen in the state's 1929 name change to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.  There 
was even an effort to create a Yugoslav national identity, but this was misleading (Wachtel 1998: 
72).  The state was Serb-dominated, in both mythos and reality (Drapac 2010: 96-97).  It was not 
intended to be multi-national—Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were the only ethnic groups 
recognized.  This left no room for minorities, and in many ways minority groups were pushed to 
assimilate.  Kosovo and Macedonia were viewed as part of South Serbia, and Macedonians in 
particular were treated as Serbs who spoke an uneducated dialect of the language (Barker 1999: 
6). 
 In the Kingdom, language unity was imposed as a matter of policy (Greenberg 2004: 21-
22), marking the beginning of the Albanian sentiment that they were "a non-Slavic people 
trapped in a Slavic state" (Bakić-Hayden 1995: 925-26).  Macedonians and Albanians alike were 
treated as Serbs, which limited their cultural and language rights (Byron 1979: 68; Franolić 
1980: 55; Nećak 1995: 23-24).  The Albanian language was not permitted in secular schools.  It 
was permitted in religious ones, however, and mullahs took advantage of this to teach Albanian 
national identity in them.  Another response was to open underground schools, and Albanian 
students secretly circulated textbooks among themselves.  Inter-government communication 
showed clear signs that the state viewed minorities as a problem to be solved.  A memorandum 
on "The Expulsion of the Albanians" pushed for a violent solution (Nećak 1995: 23), while 
Turkey and the former Ottoman territories planned population transfers to homogenize the new 
states.  Large numbers of Albanians and Slavic Muslims either fled or assimilated in the interwar 
period (Bjelajac 2007: 222-26). 
 All of this happened due to, or perhaps in spite of, post-WWI ideas of self-determination.  
In theory, any group that held a majority in a sufficiently large region was entitled to autonomy; 
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thus, Yugoslavia was for the Yugoslav nation.  Clearly, that Albanians constituted a majority in 
some regions of Yugoslavia confirms that self-determination was not a specific goal in creating 
the Kingdom.  Nevertheless, Yugoslavia behaved as though it was formed on the basis of self-
determination, seen both in the effort to create a Yugoslav nation and the attempt to 
assimilate/eliminate large minorities.  This also explains why the restriction on language rights 
only applied to Albanians and Macedonians, but not Germans or Hungarians elsewhere in 
Yugoslavia (Judah 2008: 44).  This reflected the insecurity of the new state—since Macedonian 
was similar to Bulgarian, the language could not be recognized lest Bulgaria's territorial 
ambitions be legitimized based on self-determination (Wachtel 1998: 90).  Recognition of 
Albanian created the same problem with Albania.   
 This period also marked a shift toward defining the call for Albanian autonomy within a 
framework of rights, using language as a key symbol of identity.  This began with the calls for a 
Greater Albania based on the right to self-determination, but quickly evolved when that became 
untenable.  Following the creation of the League of Nations, the Balkan states were required to 
sign minority rights treaties, designed to protect the larger minorities within them.  These were 
largely ignored (Mazower 2000: 119-20), as one might expect, given how Yugoslavia ignored 
the existence of its Albanian and Macedonian minorities.  In light of this, it is no surprise that 
Albanians were rather ambivalent during WWII toward both sides.  Under German and Italian 
influence, they realized Greater Albania and were allowed Albanian-language schools (Judah 
2008: 47-48), but it was a puppet state.  The Allied Forces may have promised more freedom, 
but there were no guarantees that Kosovo and Western Macedonia would escape Serbian 
hegemony (Durham 2001: 187; Hibbert 1999: 185). 
4. Language at the Federal Level 
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 After WWII, state boundaries remained as they were during the interwar period.  
However, the new SFRJ took a drastically different shape.  It was conceived of as a multinational 
federal republic (Hill 2011: 420), in which constituent nations each had a republic6. To limit 
Serbian hegemony, the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo were subdivided within Serbia, part 
of the republic, yet separate.  Groups who were minorities within SFRJ but had nation-states 
elsewhere were classified as nationalities, while other minority groups were labeled as ethnic 
groups.  The term minority was carefully avoided.  Once again, the state tried to create a 
Yugoslav identity; however, this time it was to be a supranational culture, created by ignoring 
ethnic identities (Wachtel 1998: 9, 131).  In a way, there could be unity from the diversity of the 
state (Nećak-Lük 1995: 115).  To achieve this, all forms of nationalism, including linguistic 
nationalism, were suppressed (Greenberg 2004: 131).  This had the effect of suppressing Serbian 
nationalism at the expense of Albanian and Macedonian self-actualization, which led to 
resentment from some Serbs (Drapac 2010: 202). 
 SFRJ acknowledged that as a multinational state, it was multilingual as well (Franolić 
1980: 56-57).  This was more complicated than it seemed, as the number of languages spoken in 
the state was not equal to the number of nations in it.  Nonetheless, it allowed for minority 
language rights in the regions where they were spoken.  Nećak-Lük explains that while the state 
based its language policy on who lived within a territory, it at the same time acknowledged the 
right of individuals to use their mother tongue (Nećak-Lük 1997: 248-50).  In many ways, 
Bugarski (1991) argues that policy focused more on rights than opportunities to use one's 
language.  However, efforts to promote literacy and education among citizens, initially more 
                                                          
6 As an anonymous reviewer points out, this generalization, while true of most republics, does not hold for Bosnia-
Herzegovina, which was home to three nations, two of which also had republics: Bosnian Muslims (later Bosniaks), 
Serbs, and Croats.   
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successful at the primary and secondary levels than university level (Wachtel 1998: 135), 
involved both local languages and Serbo-Croatian.   
 SFRJ had no official state language (Radovanović 1983: 57); however, Serbo-Croatian 
was used as a lingua franca at the federal level (Hill 2011: 420), and all citizens learned it in 
school.  Serbo-Croatian was only one of the state's official languages, however, and the 
languages of each nation (plus Albanian and Hungarian) were constitutionally equal (Bugarski 
1991; Škiljan 1991).  This was especially true under the 1974 constitution, which enshrined 
tolerance for other languages (Greenberg 2004: 164).  Institutional support was promised for 
minority languages, and at the local level, languages of nationalities were used in media and 
education (Bugarski 1991: 20).  Support was asymmetrical, however: while speakers of smaller 
languages were nearly always bilingual (Kovačec 1991), the majority rarely learned minority 
languages, even though two-way bilingualism would have created more contexts in which using 
the minority language was appropriate (Byron 1979: 67; Nećak-Lük 1995: 119-20).  Although in 
general languages of nationalities, especially Albanian, were treated well at the federal level in 
SFRJ (see Škiljan 1991), there were tensions regarding language issues as well, with some 
arguing that equality under the law did not necessarily translate into equality in practice (Byron 
1985: 68).  In particular, this may be attributed to a lack of coherence or institutional foundations 
for language planning (Bugarski 1991).  Because by this point in time language was highly 
symbolic of national identity, tensions also centered on national languages (Nećak-Lük 1997: 
249-52). 
 In individual republics, the national language was the official language (Radovanović 
1983: 57), but each republic's constitution still allowed for minority language rights, depending 
on local demographics and often determined at the district level.  Students attended classes in 
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their local language but also learned the national language (and Serbo-Croatian, when it was not 
the national language).  At this level, tensions over language would be between nations and 
nationalities—smaller ethnic groups had too few speakers for the republic to effectively serve 
their needs.  At this level, language issues became very local—different republics could have 
different laws, and so the same nationality could be affected differently depending on where 
speakers lived (Bugarski 1991: 20-21; Nećak-Lük 1995: 116).  Thus, I now discuss three 
separate cases from 1945 to the present: language policy in Kosovo, South Serbia, and 
Macedonia separately. 
4.1. Kosovo 
 At the conception of SFRJ, Kosovo was a "region" within Serbia.  This gave it limited 
autonomy, but for the most part, it was dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins (Judah 2008: 51).  
This was in part because in the years immediately after WWII, the government viewed the 
majority Albanians in Kosovo with suspicion, given their tepid support for the Partisan 
movement during the war—in fact, fighting between local Albanians and the Partisans continued 
past the end of the war (Mazower 2000: 124).  As such, they were subject to persecution by the 
state secret police, led by Aleksandar Ranković. 
 Things began to change in 1959, when the national question re-arose in Kosovo.  Tito 
was instrumental in creating the Non-Aligned Movement, which endorsed self-determination for 
peoples around the world.  There was a clear hypocrisy here—the SFRJ supported local 
autonomy, except within its own borders (Drapac 2010: 223).  In recognition of this, in 1963 
Kosovo was made an autonomous province, which brought considerably more local power to the 
region.  The next decade brought an Albanianization of the province and gradual cultural 
flourishing for Albanians (Judah 2008: 53-54).  Political persecution ended with Ranković's 
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removal in 1966 (Dimitrijević 1995: 50), while student protests in 1968 led to Albanians 
explicitly receiving the right to display national symbols and use their language (Nećak 1995: 
25-26).  In 1970, the University of Pristina, formerly a branch of the state university in Belgrade, 
became a fully-fledged university of its own.   Offering Albanian-language courses and 
programs, it was designed to be SFRJ's university for the Albanian nationality (Judah 2008: 53-
54). 
 In the 1974 Constitution, Albanians received greater recognition and rights.  Kosovo 
remained an autonomous province rather than a republic (Dimitrijević 1995: 57), but was 
essentially treated the same as other republics.  Kosovo had nearly all of the rights of the 
republics with the exception of secession rights, out of fear that Kosovo Albanians might 
exercise that right.  The Albanian language was co-official with Serbo-Croatian within Kosovo, 
and received an equal footing with other national languages in some federal institutions as well 
(Zymberi 1991: 132).  For Albanians, the educational system was Albanian first (Byron 1985: 
68), although everyone still additionally learned Serbo-Croatian (Judah 2008: 55).  The language 
saw widespread use in mass media and cultural institutions as well (Zymberi 1991: 134).  The 
next few years were the high point for Albanian language rights in Kosovo. 
 Frustrations mounted during the 1980s, however, sparked by student protests at the 
university in 1981.  While originally about institutional bureaucracy, the tone soon shifted to 
nationalist themes, with demands for Albanian equality as a nation and republic status for 
Kosovo (Drapac 2010: 266).  From this point, SFRJ and Serbia began efforts to rein in Kosovo's 
autonomy (Judah 2008: 57-58).  This was exacerbated by the 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian 
Academy of Sciences and Arts (see Tollefson 2002: 70-71), which hysterically claimed that the 
Albanian majority was waging cultural genocide against the Serbs in Kosovo (Duijzings 2000: 
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180).  Riding these sentiments, in 1987 Slobodan Milošević began using Serbian nationalist 
rhetoric in his effort to take control of Serbia and SFRJ.  In 1989, the Serbian Parliament voted to 
reabsorb Kosovo and Vojvodina into Serbia, and while they remained autonomous provinces, 
their autonomy was significantly reduced (Drapac 2010: 267).  In Kosovo, this was marked by 
displays of Serbian hegemony, including a decree that only Serbo-Croatian be taught in schools 
(Nećak-Lük 1995: 120).  By 1991, the Albanian language was completely removed from the 
University of Pristina (International Crisis Group 1998: 4-5).  Albanian was disallowed for 
official use (Greenberg 2004: 164), and Serbian symbols were instituted across the region, 
including signage in the Cyrillic alphabet (Judah 2008: 73).  Friedman (2004) notes that there are 
few reliable statistics of language use in Kosovo at this time; however, Serbian media was 
dominant throughout the 1990s, as the only television station broadcast half an hour of Albanian 
per day and the remainder in Serbian (Zdravković-Zonta 2011: 178). 
 As SFRJ split into its constituent republics in the 1990s, Kosovo remained part of Serbia. 
However, in 1991 the Kosovo Parliament unsuccessfully declared independence; this was 
nullified by the Serbian Parliament and recognized only by Albania.  Nevertheless, Kosovars set 
up a shadow government that ran parallel institutions for the Albanian population (Judah 2008: 
69-73).  This especially extended to the educational system, as teachers taught Albanians 
separately using the older Kosovo curriculum.  In recent years, Serbs and Albanians have not 
studied together in Kosovo at the primary or secondary levels (Fridman 2011: 145).   
 In 1997, some Kosovo Albanians disheartened by the lack of visible progress made 
through nonviolent efforts began attacking policemen and other Serbian institutions, claiming 
responsibility as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA was not equipped itself to 
engage in war against Serbia, but rather hoped to provoke a response from the international 
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community.  This effort succeeded, as in 1998 Serbia began punitive actions in Kosovo, which 
the United Nations condemned.  NATO intervened in 1999, and Serbia lost control over the 
region. 
 In a way, NATO ended Serbian persecution, allowing for Albanian persecution of Serbs 
to begin in the early 2000s (Judah 2008: 154-55).  Serbian language and symbols were 
immediately removed from the public sphere.  Streets and statues previously named for Serbian 
or Communist leaders were renamed for Albanians (Judah 2008: 25).  Albanian media expanded 
quickly, at the expense of disappearing Serbian print media.  According to Zdravković-Zonta, it 
was now the Serb community that was denied the right to use their language.  NATO's Kosovo 
Force, assigned to protect Kosovars, initially did little to protect the now-vulnerable Serbs (p. 
172-73).  The Albanian parts of Kosovo were essentially a UN protectorate under administration 
by the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), while Serbia still had influence in the Serb-majority 
region north of the Ibar River.  The groups were segregated in the rest of Kosovo, as Serbs 
retreated to enclaves separate from Albanian-speaking towns.  Tensions remained high, peaking 
with anti-Serbian riots in Mitrovica in March 2004.   
 Under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo stayed a part of Serbia until it 
made enough progress to justify revisiting its status (Judah 2008: 109).  This was admittedly 
vague, and after the 2004 riots this framework was revised into the Ahtisaari Plan, which 
basically called for an independent Kosovo as a multicultural state.  The Ahtisaari Plan was 
rejected by Serbia and Russia, but in 2008 Kosovo declared independence anyway, stating that 
the new state would implement the Plan (Judah 2008: 115).  In theory, the state is founded on 
civic nationalism rather than ethnic, but this is not necessarily seen in practice.  This may be seen 
in the Law on the Use of Languages of 2006.  Albanian and Serbian are designated as official 
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languages, with specific usage rights within central institutions, courts, public enterprises, 
education, and state media.  While in many respects Kosovo follows the law, the results vary.  
Serbs and Albanians are still segregated, and public places outside of North Kosovo are 
dominated by the Albanian language (Fridman 2011: 145).  Efforts to integrate the Serbian 
language into the state are met with frustration—for example, while street signs are bilingual, the 
Serbian parts are often covered up with graffiti.  Documents may be translated, but the 
translations are of poor quality.  This reinforces that while both Serbian and Albanian may be 
official state languages on paper, knowledge of Albanian is imperative for participation in the 
public and social life of Kosovo (International Crisis Group 2012: 2-3). 
 Serbia has exacerbated the problem by not recognizing the state and running parallel 
institutions in the Serbian enclaves7.  In these, Serb students attend Serbian-funded educational 
systems, learning a Serbian curriculum in opposition to the Albanian curriculum used by the rest 
of Kosovo (International Crisis Group 2012: 22-23). The separate education system and other 
parallel institutions create a language barrier between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians, which 
emphasizes the division between groups.  Zymberi (1991) argues that reciprocal bilingualism is 
necessary to avoid devaluing speakers and their national identities.  In the 1980s, this was 
because Serbs rarely learned Albanian; today, the same could be said in the case of Albanians 
not learning Serbian.  There currently is no bilingual education, to the point that younger 
Albanians and Serbs use English to communicate.  Even older Serbs in the north are unlikely to 
understand Albanian (International Crisis Group, 2011b: 3-7).  This is especially problematic 
since Albanian has become crucial for participation in society outside of the enclaves, with Serbs 
                                                          
7 While talks from 2012 on have led to some agreements (International Crisis Group 2013: i), in many respects the 
parallel institutions remain. 
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now a linguistic minority.  Only in a few municipalities are Serbian and Albanian treated equally 
(International Crisis Group 2012: 15). 
4.2. Macedonia 
 The Republic of Macedonia was created as part of SFRJ in 1944.  This was remarkable, 
considering that before this Macedonia was a very fluid concept (Durham 1905: 58).  
Furthermore, because SFRJ was structured so that only nations had republics, this meant the 
creation of Macedonia was in effect the recognition of the Macedonian people.  Because the 
nation was so new, it was easiest to define negatively—Macedonians were neither Greeks, Serbs, 
Bulgarians, nor Albanians (Troebst 1999: 70).  They needed their own language, so the 
Macedonian language was standardized soon after (Franolić 1980: 60; Greenberg 2004: 8).  
Previously thought of as a dialect of either Serbo-Croatian or Bulgarian, corpus planners took 
care to make sure it was neither (Reuter 1999: 30).  For a brief period though, the republic was in 
the position of having a national language used in education and at the federal level, while some 
uncertainty regarding its linguistic profile persisted.   
 While in SFRJ, Macedonia treated minority language rights well.  Language was 
explicitly addressed in the republic's 1946 constitution, which gave the right to private and public 
use of a language.  Articles 12 and 72-75 spelled out some of these rights: use in administration, 
courts, signage, and education (Caca 1999: 150-51).  The quality of education and access to it 
improved as time went on.  In the 1950s, Albanian students used their own language, and then 
learned Macedonian for three hours per week in grades 3-8.  Serbo-Croatian was not taught to 
Albanians at a literary level (Wachtel 1998: 180).  As it improved, education began in the local 
language and introduced Macedonian and Serbo-Croatian later.  Albanian students tended to 
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focus on Serbo-Croatian over Macedonian because it was more useful in career advancement and 
broader communication within the SFRJ (Greenberg 2004: 164-66). 
 The 1974 constitution gave more equality to Macedonian at the federal level, but little 
changed within the republic.  In some ways, Macedonian was locally hegemonic—in schools, for 
example, it was privileged so greatly over Serbo-Croatian that Albanians were not even taught 
Serbo-Croatian anymore, focusing instead on Macedonian.  However, primary and secondary 
education in Albanian schools was still in Albanian, and the language was given equivalent 
status to Macedonian in regions with a significant population.  This was visibly reflected in 
public use of signage and scripts for both languages (Caca 1999: 152).  The 1980s took a 
problematic turn though, as Macedonian leadership followed Serbia's lead in Kosovo and 
implemented repressive policies on Albanian language and culture at the same time that 
Albanians began agitating for language policy to better adhere to the principles of the 1974 
constitution (see Friedman 1993: 82-85).  The Albanian language was removed from secondary 
schools under the justification that Albanian education left Albanians not knowing Macedonian 
well enough to participate in society (Zymberi 1991: 136-137).  Additionally, policies requiring 
the use of Slavic toponyms (Friedman 1993: 83) and prohibiting ethnic Albanian babies from 
being given so-called nationalist names were implemented.  The latter policy continued until 
1992 (International Crisis Group 1998: 2). 
 Macedonia was not immune to the nationalist tensions that flared up as the SFRJ fell 
apart.  Some of this was a push against the repressive policies of the 1980s—Albanian students 
refused to accept their diplomas during the 1989-90 school year, as they were presented in 
Macedonian.  By this point, Albanian-language education had been restricted to the elementary 
level only (Reuter 1999: 36-37).  The 1990 parliamentary elections appeared to be a positive 
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step, as for the first and only time in SFRJ's history, both ethnic and civic parties won seats 
(Mirčev 1999: 205-06).  This was perhaps misleading.  Immediately after declaring 
independence in 1991, the Macedonian government removed Serbo-Croatian from the national 
curriculum (Greenberg 2004: 164-66).   
 Independent Macedonia was conceived of first and foremost as a nation-state.  This was 
seen clearly in its constitution, which paid lip service to minority rights while emphasizing "the 
historical fact that Macedonia is constituted as the national state of the Macedonian people."  
Although minority groups were given the right to use their language in Article 7, the same article 
explicitly defined Macedonian as the official language of the state, and Cyrillic as the official 
alphabet.  Likewise, Articles 45 and 48 allowed for minority languages to be used in the 
educational system, but also asserted that Macedonian would be taught (International Crisis 
Group 1998: 24-25).  Minority language rights did not mean a multilingual society was the goal; 
there was clear pressure to assimilate in order to participate in the state or get jobs (Caca 1999: 
157).  The protection of minority language rights in the constitution was less a gesture of 
goodwill than the need to comply with the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Caca 1999: 148-49).  
Because Macedonia did not accept diplomas from the University of Pristina, there was no 
Albanian-language higher education, and declining numbers of qualified Albanian-speaking 
teachers (Pettifer, 1999a: 142). 
 Macedonia's leaders feared that its non-Albanian Muslim population would assimilate not 
to the majority group, but to the predominantly Muslim Albanian group (Poulton 1999: 114-20).  
They also feared that Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece would tear the state apart in a land 
grab (Pettifer, 1999b: 17).  These fears dictated language policies from the beginning of the 
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state's existence, as well as the state's response when tensions over language inevitably rose.  
Albanians were upset that the lingua communis of the state had changed from Serbo-Croatian to 
Macedonian, and pushed for national status co-equal with Macedonian within the state 
(Greenberg 2004: 164-66).  Albanian efforts centered around the creation of an Albanian-
language university and more representation in the media.  This request was met to a degree in 
the media (International Crisis Group 1998: 9), but because the state feared Albanian rights 
would undermine the Macedonian nation, the requests regarding education were refused.  
Despite this refusal, Albanian activists started a university in Tetovo in 1995.  This was quickly 
declared illegal by the state, and attempts were made to shut it down (International Crisis Group 
1998: 4-5).  Even though it was illegal and unrecognized, the University of Tetovo had 4,000 
students in 1998 (International Crisis Group, 2000: 18-20; Pettifer, 1999a: 142). 
 In many ways, the University of Tetovo was serving as a proxy for other issues 
(Friedman 2004: 201).  These came to a head in 2001, when there was a brief conflict between 
the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) and the state.  This came to an end when both 
sides signed the Ohrid Agreement, which provided a blueprint for better incorporating Albanians 
into the Macedonian state (International Crisis Group, 2011a: 1).  Most of the agreement came 
about easily, but language proved to be one of the final sticking points, only solved by 
compromise phrasings discussing the "citizens" of Macedonia (Greenberg 2004: 164-66).  
Albanians wanted their language to be a second official language of Macedonia, but the 
government insisted that this could not happen, arguing that it would violate the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the state.  Instead, the Albanian language holds that status only in areas like 
Western Macedonia that have a large Albanian population.  The parts of the constitution that 
were egregiously anti-minority were changed.  However, the laws providing for minority 
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language rights were only passed in 2008, solely affecting municipalities with an Albanian 
population of 20% or more.  Even so, there have been complaints that Macedonian mayors 
refuse to implement the law (International Crisis Group, 2011a: 14-17).  As a result, the capital 
of Skopje still appears to be a monolingual city in signage.  In cities like this, there is a visible 
sense of segregation.   
 The Ohrid Agreement provided for greatly expanded minority language rights.  The 
educational system now provides full elementary and secondary education not only in 
Macedonian and Albanian, but in Serbian and Turkish as well.  This is a positive development, 
but at the same time it means students are kept segregated because they do not speak each other's 
languages.  All students still learn Macedonian, but families have the right to decide when they 
begin, following a 2010 Supreme Court ruling in which Albanians successfully argued that any 
imposed curriculum of another language violated their language rights.  Higher education in 
Albanian became available and state-sanctioned under the Ohrid framework as well.  To avoid 
the embarrassment of recognizing the University of Tetovo, the government instead founded 
Tetovo State University in the same city, which offers a curriculum that includes Albanian and 
English instruction (International Crisis Group, 2011a: 17).  Since 2001, Macedonia has been 
mostly peaceful.  There are still occasional clashes along ethnic lines—most recently in 2011 
(International Crisis Group, 2011a: 14) and 2013—but they are more or less contained. 
4.3. Serbia 
 Zymberi (1991) suggests that during the SFRJ years, in Serbia proper the Albanian 
population was small enough that expecting the same conditions for Albanian language use as in 
Kosovo or Macedonia would be unrealistic (p. 137).  In the Preševo Valley, however, three 
municipalities have a large Albanian population—95% in Preševo, 65% in Bujanovac, and 35% 
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in Medveđa (International Crisis Group 2001: 2).  The area was historically considered part of 
Kosovo, but in 1959 Serbia redrew the borders to insert the Serbian population in North Kosovo 
and keep the valley for itself (Judah 2008: 5).  This was for strategic purposes—SFRJ's main rail 
line ran through Preševo, and plans for a East-Central European highway include it in the route 
(International Crisis Group 2001: 2). 
 Like the other SFRJ republics, Serbia allowed for minority education.  Because Kosovo 
was still a part of Serbia, the republic used the Kosovo curriculum for Albanians in the valley.  
Thus, their fortunes largely depended on the fortunes of those in Kosovo.  As Serbia began 
repressing Kosovo, it began repressing Albanians in the Preševo Valley as well—for example, 
the Kosovo curriculum was removed in 1982, and language and cultural rights were scaled back 
from 1983 through the 1990s (International Crisis Group 2003: 21). 
 Even as part of the rump Yugoslavia, the situation in the Preševo Valley changed greatly 
as SFRJ disintegrated.  In 1992, local Albanians held a referendum in which a majority voted to 
join Kosovo (International Crisis Group 2003: 1), which by this point had itself unsuccessfully 
declared independence.  No one actually expected that Serbia would permit this, but it still had 
the effect of proving the impending threat of irredentists forming a Greater Albania to those who 
sought evidence of it (International Crisis Group 2003: 10).  In 2001 the Liberation Army of 
Preševo, Bujanovac, and Medveđa (UCPMB) attempted to begin a separatist conflict in the 
demilitarized zone along the border with Kosovo.  Cooler heads prevailed, however, and Serbia 
sought a peaceful means to end the conflict.  NATO sided with Serbia, and the conflict was 
resolved more through diplomacy and negotiations than violence.  By and large, the local people 
did not support the UCPMB during the conflict (International Crisis Group 2001: ii-4). 
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 The conflict ended with both sides signing the Čović Plan, which provided a detailed 
guide for the Serbian government to improve its treatment of the Albanians.  At first, local 
Albanians viewed it as treasonous to participate, but they eventually came around (International 
Crisis Group 2007: 8).  The Čović Plan included several features of language policy, including a 
new Law on National Minorities, which made languages official in municipalities where 15% or 
more of the population spoke them.  After it was passed in 2002, this made Albanian an official 
language in the municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac, and Medveđa.  Considerable effort was 
made to improve Albanian-language media as well; however, while it is now present in 
Bujanovac and Preševo, the reporting is of low quality.  In an outreach effort, 4,800 Albanian-
language books were purchased for the Preševo public library (International Crisis Group 2003: 
21). 
 Schools had previously faced the same problem as in Macedonia: Serbia stopped 
recognizing diplomas from the University of Pristina.  This drastically reduced the number of 
qualified Albanian teachers, especially when Serbia instituted a requirement that teachers carry 
four-year degrees, rather than two-year (International Crisis Group 2001: 13).  This was 
problematic, as the majority of students in the region were Albanian (International Crisis Group 
2007: 3).  Under the Čović Plan, diplomas from the Kosovo Albanian parallel institution in 
Pristina were accepted as long as they carried a stamp of approval from UNMIK, which certified 
that the recipient had passed an external exam on their field.  Furthermore, in 2006 Serbia 
announced plans to open a new high school and a teachers' college in Bujanovac.  Until it 
opened, its potential students were studying in Kosovo, Albania, or Macedonia (International 
Crisis Group 2007: 14).  This change allowed schools to improve, although their textbooks were 
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of poor quality even several years later.  As in Macedonia, schools in the Preševo Valley are 
segregated by language (International Crisis Group 2003: 21). 
 The Čović Plan has, for the most part, kept the peace in South Serbia, and has been 
considered "one of the rare conflict resolution success stories in the former Yugoslavia."  It has 
not been perfect; many rural villages emptied by violence are still empty (International Crisis 
Group 2007: i-2).  There have also been sporadic incidents in the last decade.  For example, in 
2003 a group calling itself the Albanian National Army tried sparking violent conflict, however, 
they received no support from the local population (International Crisis Group 2003: i).  In 
addition, there is still a perception of Serbian bias toward Albanians (International Crisis Group 
2007: 3-5).  Albanians have continued pushing for expanded language rights, like bilingual 
identity cards—currently, the label is bilingual but the content is entirely in Serbian 
(International Crisis Group 2007: 14).  Overall though, a naive visitor to the Preševo Valley 
would not realize there had been a recent conflict (International Crisis Group 2007: 1-2). 
5. What Can We Learn? 
 As things stand, there are four potential routes for language policy in Kosovo, 
Macedonia, and Serbia to pursue8: 
1. All minorities assimilate to the national language.  This comes with a loss of heritage and 
identity, but potentially increased social cohesion and mobility. 
2. All minorities remain separate, with their own institutions. This preserves tradition and 
identity, at the expense of segregation. 
3. All minorities are neglected. This marginalizes each minority equally. 
4. Balanced bilingualism for both majority and minority groups. 
                                                          
8 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for assistance in clarifying these possibilities. 
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In the above case studies, routes (1) and (3) are immediately untenable, and route (2) would only 
provide a temporary fix.  I suggest route (4) is in fact the necessary, albeit idealistic, solution.  
 Skutnabb-Kangas (2001) argues that when a state does not grant minority linguistic 
rights, ethnic conflicts often arise in response (p. 204).  In these case studies, we have seen 
exactly that: policies of assimilation or neglect (routes 1 and 3), whether in education, media, or 
elsewhere, have gone hand-in-hand with ethnic conflicts.  This is because in the 1980s in 
particular, language policies took a turn from promoting a multinational state to promoting 
structural violence toward minorities.  These policies were designed to protect individual 
republic's territorial integrity and assert power and control over the minority population 
(Skutnabb-Kangas 1997: 312).  These were accompanied by other instances of physical and 
structural violence as well, but as language is ubiquitous in everyday life, these policies are 
clear-cut examples.  It is no wonder that minority groupness crystallized in each of these regions 
in response to violent language policies.  Furthermore, these case studies show that negative 
peace—the absence of war—is not enough to end conflict in these regions; there also needs to be 
positive peace—an absence of structural violence (Galtung 1969).  Previous policies need to be 
acknowledged and righted in order to for there to be peace. 
 Because of this, justice was and is a key part of resolving these conflicts.  Aside from 
punishing perpetrators of war crimes, this involves undoing the structural violence that helped 
instigate the situation.  As such, policies ensuring positive language rights are necessary. 
Whether or not this was an explicit goal, the Ahtisaari Plan, Ohrid Agreement, and Čović Plan 
all work to address it, with varying degrees of success.  This is why each plan involves 
concessions on language rights: creating policies that avoid future injustices is a key aspect of 
promoting justice (Kriesberg 2004: 100).  This occurred even in cases where the separatist group 
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was ultimately unsuccessful, because social justice should not depend on majority rule (Williams 
1997: 433).  However, this also illustrates the difficulty in eliminating unjust practices: there is a 
fine line between undoing an unjust situation and creating one in the opposite direction 
(Kriesberg 2004: 83-84).  While Macedonia and Serbia have stayed on the right side of this line, 
Kosovo has failed.  Its odd situation has contributed—here more than anywhere else, "a majority 
in one period became a minority in another and vice versa" (Nećak-Lük 1995: 114).  While part 
of Serbia, it swung from Serb-dominated to Albanian-dominated and back again.  Now that it is 
independent, the pendulum has swung again toward Albanian hegemony, despite the stated goal 
of a multicultural state.  Practices of language policy have reflected these shifts, and today Serbs 
are in a position of language discrimination similar to what Albanians were in just fifteen years 
ago.  Given the state's history of correcting injustice with injustice, it is no surprise that of the 
three conflicts discussed, the one in Kosovo is the most intractable. 
 However, even solutions that avoid creating new unjust situations encounter a major 
problem: the segregation of majority and minority populations, particularly in the educational 
system (route 2).  Scarry writes that in order to solve the problem of imagining the Other, we 
must eliminate the structure of "foreignness" (p. 40).  While the segregation of schools and 
communities solves immediate problems, it nonetheless creates and rigidifies such a structure.  
However, segregation has been offered as a solution for decades now.  Edith Durham argued in 
letters that partitioning land was the only path to peace (Durham 2001: 217-18), and currently 
partition is often proposed as a fix in Kosovo9  But even as partition and segregation keep the 
foreign element away from the majority, they still maintain the foreign element as foreign, 
maintaining the possibility of future conflict.  Within the Preševo Valley, Serbia has done a 
                                                          
9 After the Serbia and Kosovo agreed to normalize relations in the 2013 Brussels Agreement between Serbia and 
Kosovo (Barlovac 2013), this appears to have been taken off the table as an option.  Implementation of the 
agreement is still up in the air in many respects, however. 
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better job of integration of Albanians—for example, integrating its local police in the Preševo 
Valley immediately after the 2001 conflict—than Macedonia, and Serbia has had fewer incidents 
than Macedonia in the years since.  This is not a coincidence.   
 A need for integration means that positive language rights for Albanian speakers cannot 
come at the expense of other populations.  Skutnabb-Kangas (2001) argues that linguistic and 
educational rights are necessary for conflict prevention (p. 204), but here, they are necessary for 
conflict resolution as well.  Balanced bilingualism, previously advocated by Zymberi (1991) for 
Albanians and Serbs alike in Serbia and Kosovo, and Albanians and Macedonians alike in 
Macedonia (route 4) is not only an appealing possibility, but a necessary solution.  This is easier 
said than done; multilingualism does not fit a nationalist agenda (Heller 2008).  The symbolic 
link between language and power means a change in language status represents a change in 
power relations, making shift to positive language rights and balanced bilingualism quite 
difficult (Wright 2007).  However, this is perhaps precisely why such a shift is necessary: it 
would be highly symbolic of the change in power relations that needs to happen.   
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I explore three case studies in oppressive language policy in the former 
SFRJ.  Since language policy can be a glaring example of structural violence within a state, 
ethnic conflicts often emerge either over language rights or with language as a key symbolic 
issue.  In the case of the former SFRJ, this situation plays out in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia, 
and discriminatory language policies served as both indicator of a potential conflict and the 
eventual cause.  Even as conflict was of a similar nature in each state—it erupted over treatment 
of the same ethnic group by local Slavs, and Macedonia followed the Serbian example in 
creating a nation-state—we can see that addressing language policies differently in each region 
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led to different outcomes.  Kosovo remains intractable in part because of its current policies of 
linguistic discrimination against Serbs, while Macedonia and Serbia have been relatively 
peaceful and stable since making corrections that lessen the degree of structural violence.  
Improved language policies, then, have served as conflict resolution tools and could serve as 
such in Kosovo as well.  The promotion of positive language rights and balanced bilingualism 
for all groups, particularly in education, would improve the situation greatly (in each state, but 
particularly Kosovo).  In some ways, this would put the Balkan states on par with the English-
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